WMUN 2018 Summer Conference

International Atomic Energy Agency

Head Chair: Sinhwa Roh
Deputy Chair: Hyena Cho

Table of Contents

I. Greetings

Sinhwa Roh Head Chair

Greetings Delegates,
I am Sinhwa Roh, sophomore at Sejong Global High School, and I am honored to be serving as your Head Chair for WMUN 2018.
It is my wish that the two days of WMUN and the days that come before and after will be remembered, and worth remembering. To make this possible, I ask all delegates to participate enthusiastically and show passion from start to finish.
The agenda which will be addressed is a crucially important one, concerning peace and safety of the global community. It is obvious that the agenda however, is a hard and complicated one. I cannot say that tackling the matter will be easy, but through this experience, delegates will hone negotiating skills and gain insights into the basics of international politics. With these assets in hand, delegates will be able to climb another step towards becoming global leaders.

Again, welcome to WMUN 2018.

Hyena Cho Deputy Chair

Greetings, delegates. Welcome to International Atomic Energy Agency.
This is deputy chair Hyena Cho, sophomore at Incheon International High school.
There would be several reasons you applied for our community, and I can assure to my delegates that you made a good choice. As a global citizen, we must foster an awareness of our role and responsibility in global problems such as nuclear issue. It is necessary to keep in mind that we will be the 21st century leader who is more open to and more thoughtful about the world.
This experience in WMUN will definitely help your understanding of the nuclear problem which is a critical problem, influencing the whole world. I will do my best to make your time in WMUN an invaluable experience. Lets come together to solve ongoing problems as “a citizen of the world”.
After this WMUN, you will be surprised to see yourself who made a significant improvement on leadership and responsibility through debating on global issues.

II. Committee Introduction

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world's central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field. It works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, contributing to international peace and security and the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals.

The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. The Agency's genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953. The U.S. Ratification of the Statute by President Eisenhower, 29 July 1957, marks the official birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the press conference following the signing ceremony in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, D.C., President Eisenhower evoked his address to the UN General Assembly in December 1953, at which he had proposed to establish the IAEA. The IAEA is strongly linked to nuclear technology and its controversial applications, either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool. The ideas President Eisenhower expressed in his speech in 1953 helped shape the IAEA's statute, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956.

The Agency was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. From the beginning, it was given the mandate to work with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The objectives of the IAEA's dual mission – to promote and control the Atom – are defined in Article II of the IAEA Statute.

The Medium Term Strategy has been prepared through a joint consultation process among Member States and the Secretariat. It covers a period of six years from 2018 to 2023. The strategy serves as a strategic direction and roadmap for the Secretariat to prepare the Agency's program and budget during the period covered by it, by identifying priorities among and within its programs for three biennia for the achievement of the Agency's statutory objectives in an evolving international environment.

The IAEA is an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, in the United Nations family, that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation; It assists its Member States, in the context of social and economic goals, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for various peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, and facilitates the transfer of such technology and knowledge in a sustainable manner to developing Member States;

IAEA develops nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards, promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment against ionizing radiation;

It verifies through its inspection system that States comply with their commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes.

III. Agenda Explanation

"Improving Global Cooperation and
reaching a consensus on nuclear disarmament"

A) Background Information

The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands. The steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.

One year ago, we called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The interest, momentum and growing political space that has been created to address these issues over the past year has been extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all over the world. Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for urgent action: "It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious." In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating: "What we need is both a vision—a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons—and action—progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy.

These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak." We have also been encouraged by additional indications of general support for this project from other former U.S. officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors. These include: Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell. Inspired by this reaction, in October 2007, we convened veterans of the past six administrations, along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, for a conference at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. There was general agreement about the importance of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as a guide to our thinking about nuclear policies, and about the importance of a series of steps that will pull us back from the nuclear precipice. In parallel with these steps by the U.S. and Russia, the dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations.

Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations, by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities. The government of Norway will sponsor a conference in February

that will contribute to this process. Another subject: Developing an international system to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the growing global interest in developing nuclear energy and the potential proliferation of nuclear enrichment capabilities, an international program should be created by advanced nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA. The purpose should be to provide for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel, reserves of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance, financing, and spent fuel management—to ensure that the means to make nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe. There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.

As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations would become involved. President Reagan's maxim of "trust but verify" should be reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials.

B) Glossary

Nuclear Disarmament

The elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction

CVID

CVID is the acronym of 'complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement'.
If Pyongyang agrees to carry out a CVID of their nuclear program, the dismantlement would have to be complete. Pyongyang must also allow observers inside the country to check on North Korea's progress, which would likely take place in a series of verifiable steps.

C) Past Actions

About the global consensus, there has been a long discussion about this topic. The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95 percent of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join. Some steps are already in progress, such as the ongoing reductions in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range, or strategic, bombers and missiles. Other near-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 2008, can in and of themselves dramatically reduce nuclear dangers. They include:

● Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. Much has been learned about the vital task of verification from the application of these provisions. The treaty is scheduled to expire on Dec. 5, 2009. The key provisions of this treaty, including their essential monitoring and verification requirements, should be extended, and the further

reductions agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions should be completed as soon as possible.

● Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks. Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows in the U.S.-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.

● Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days. Interpreting deterrence as requiring mutual assured destruction (MAD) is an obsolete policy in today's world, with the U.S. and Russia formally having declared that they are allied against terrorism and no longer perceive each other as enemies.

● Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit meeting. This should include agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the U.S. from the Middle East, along with completion of work to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. Reducing tensions over missile defense will enhance the possibility of progress on the broader range of nuclear issues so essential to our security. Failure to do so will make broader nuclear cooperation much more difficult.

● Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb. There are nuclear weapons materials in more than forty countries around the world, and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The U.S., Russia and other nations that have worked with the Nunn-Lugar programs, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should play a key role in helping to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 relating to improving nuclear security— by offering teams to assist jointly any nation in meeting its obligations under this resolution to provide for appropriate, effective security of these materials.

D) Case Study

i) US

Cold War

For almost half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (mad). By the early 1960s, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to committing suicide. During the Cold War, many scholars and policy analysts believed that mad made the world relatively stable and peaceful because it induced great caution in international politics, discouraged the use of nuclear threats to resolve disputes, and generally restrained the superpowers' behavior. (Revealingly, the last intense nuclear standoª, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, occurred at the dawn of the era of mad.) Because of the nuclear stalemate, the optimists argued, the era of intentional great-power wars had ended. Critics of mad, however, argued that it prevented not great-power war but the rolling back of the power and influence of a dangerously expansionist and totalitarian Soviet Union. From that perspective, mad prolonged the life of an evil empire.

Post-cold war

Since the Cold War's end, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has significantly improved. The United States has replaced the ballistic missiles on its submarines with the substantially more accurate Trident II d-5 missiles, many of which carry new, larger-yield warheads. The U.S. Navy has shifted a greater proportion of its ssbns to the Pacific so that they can patrol near the Chinese coast or in the blind spot of Russia's early warning radar network.The U.S. Air Force has finished equipping its b-52 bombers with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which are probably invisible to Russian and Chinese air-defense radar. And the air force has also enhanced the avionics on its b-2 stealth bombers to permit them to fly at extremely low altitudes in order to avoid even the most sophisticated radar. Finally, although the air force finished dismantling its highly lethal mx missiles in 2005 to comply with arms control agreements, it is significantly improving its remaining icbms by installing the mx's high-yield warheads and advanced reentry vehicles on Minuteman icbms, and it has upgraded the Minuteman's guidance systems to match the mx's accuracy.

While the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated. Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer icbms, and 80 percent fewer ssbns than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts uggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers(However, it is known that Russia ordered 10 upgraded supersonic nuclear-capable bombers at the start of the year.) , now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored oª-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based icbms have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests

and low rates of production. Russia's mobile icbms rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sucient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so.
The improvements to the U.S. nuclear arsenal o"er evidence that the United States is actively seeking primacy. The intentional pursuit of nuclear primacy is, moreover, entirely consistent with the United States' declared policy of expanding its global dominance. The Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy explicitly states that the United States aims to establish military primacy: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." To this end, the United States is openly seeking primacy in every dimension of modern military technology, both in its conventional arsenal and in its nuclear forces.

ii) North Korea

The Korean peninsula was divided after World War Two and the North developed into a Stalinesque authoritarian system. Being isolated globally, it saw nuclear weapons as its only deterrent against a world it believed was seeking to destroy it. North Korea has carried out six nuclear tests. One, it says, was a hydrogen bomb. It claims, though this remains unverified, to have developed a nuclear bomb small enough to be carried by long-range missile. It also has a ballistic missile experts believe could reach the US, Pyongyang's main adversary. In response the UN, the US and the EU have imposed tough sanctions. Theoretically, North Korea was always open to negotiations. But after months of saber-rattling, it came as a surprise when Mr. Kim said he was "open to dialogue" in January 2018. Mr. Trump then proved willing to ignore the pre-talk conditions past presidents have imposed. When China backed sanctions that further pressurized Pyongyang - though the North insists they weren't decisive. In April the Koreas' two leaders met and agreed to find a way to end the Korean War. They said they would "denuclearize the peninsula" - without agreeing what that meant (while the US pushed for CVID, NK hoped to use nuclear energy for 'peaceful' purposes). Pyongyang ordered a halt to tests, freed US detainees and destroyed its nuclear research site. Then on 12 June, Mr. Trump became the first sitting president to meet a North Korean leader. At their Singapore summit, Mr. Kim reiterated his commitment to denuclearization. But observers said the document the pair signed did not explain the details. Previous attempts to negotiate aid-for-disarmament deals have failed.

iii) IAEA

Widely known as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family, the IAEA is the international centre for cooperation in the nuclear field. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the

deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. The Agency's genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953. The IAEA is strongly linked to nuclear technology and its controversial applications, either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool. The ideas President Eisenhower expressed in his speech in 1953 helped shape the IAEA's statue, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956. The Agency was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. From the beginning, it was given the mandate to work with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The objectives of the IAEA's dual mission are to promote and control the Atom.

E) Bloc Points

i) Questions to Consider

- The denuclearization of a hegemon such as US could lead to international confusion and instability of the system. Would it be a benefit for the global society for US be included in the scope of nations that should be denuclearized?
- Is the restraint sustainable for nuclear weapons and Non-proliferation?
- It is hard to persuade a nuclear power station in a peaceful way. Is there a way to facilitate cooperation?
- There are a lots of benefit for the nuclear power station which is the country with nuclear weapons. How should the international society approach this problem of benefits to nuclear power station?
- Why have some nations acquired nuclear weapons while others have refrained? Is there is a reason, is it reasonable?

ii) Debatable points

The use of nuclear energy in a peaceful manner

Following World System Theory, nations of the UN blocking states such as NK from obtaining nuclear energy could be considered subordination. When taking North Korea as an example, US would be the core nation exerting domination, causing North Korea to be trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty and binding North Korea in its position as a periphery state. In the second of the six party talks, the six nations - the six states with the closest relation with the matter of NK nuclear crisis- had a disagreement on the matter of peaceful nuclear energy. While the US, South Korea and Japan pushed for 'complete' denuclearization, China, Russia and NK demanded that a civil nuclear energy program be allowed. This was one of the driving forces behind the failure of round 2.

How to impose a restraint on the principles of manufacture, possession and prohibition of nuclear weapons

The international safeguards system has since 1970 successfully prevented the diversion of fissile materials into weapons. Its scope has been widened to address undeclared nuclear activities. The society must tighten the system more. Most countries participate in international initiatives designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is not a problem which can be solved by one leading country. Perception of seriousness of the nuclear weapons that can threaten the global peace must be alerted to world. More specifically the economic sanction must be imposed for the country which try to develop nuclear weapons. Giving disadvantages to the possession of the nuclear weapon is crucial, but actually in reality there are more good than harm to the Country possessing nuclear weapon. They get recognition to the international society and have power as they possess. This must be changed with a strict restraint.

F) Bibliograph

손한별. (2015). 이란의 비핵화 가능성과 북핵문제. 국방과 기술, (431), 48-59.

민경길. (2000). [특집] 북한의 핵무기체계에 대한 국제법상 규제. 전략연구, , 114-144.

김정균. (2004). 핵무기 규제의 법리(法理). 인도법논총, (24), 13-41.

서중석. (2002). 국제원자력기구(IAEA)의 표준 개발 동향. 전기저널, , 17-25.

김현. (2011). 핵군축 거버넌스와 시민사회. 아태연구, 18(2), 69-96.

Yihei Zhao, Sung-Hack Kang. (2017). China’s Policy Towards North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program. 한국정치학회보, 51(3), 111-132.

Daryl G. Press. (2013). How to Respond to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons. 전략연구, , 47-62.

The rise of US nuclear primacy. KA Lieber, DG Press - Foreign Affairs, 2006

김지현. (2017). 한반도의 비핵화에 관한 공동선언. 통일법연구, 3, 141-168.

David Fischer(1997), IAEA, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency The First Forty Years David Fischer

GP Shultz(2008), Wall Street journal, Toward a nuclear free world

Andrew O'Neil(2009), Nuclear Weapons and Non-proliferation: Is Restraint Sustainable?